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Executive Registry

76-6904/V

OLC 76-0395/a

17 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Arab/Israeli Military Balance

1. Over the past several months we have provided a number of briefings on the Hill on this subject at the request of various committees and members. Subsequently, an Israeli team, including Prime Minister Rabin, provided briefings on the Hill which pointed out what they felt were inadequacies in our assessment.

2. Representative David Obey (D., Wis.), on the Appropriations Committee, has been particularly interested in our assessment, and following Rabin's presentation to the Appropriations Committee, he requested our comments on Rabin's assessment.

3. [] NIO/ME, has pulled together the answers to the specific questions raised by Representative Obey. He would like to avoid further personal briefings at this juncture. It is Sam's understanding that General Scowcroft will be answering these same questions to Ambassador Dinitz.

4. Your approval is requested to provide to Representative Obey the information contained in [] paper and to the other committees we have briefed on this subject, including our oversight committees. We do not propose to leave the paper on the Hill.



George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel

Attachments

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
6/26/2003

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76-6904/1

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[]

25X1A

George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel

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Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - DDCI

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OLC/[] (15 Feb 76)

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Executive Registry

76-6904

National Intelligence Officers

12 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

STATINTL

1. Attached are a set of answers to the questions posed by Representative Obey. These are factually correct, and I have checked them for acceptability with the NSC Staff. I have not, however, reviewed them with the DCI since I thought you would prefer to take that action yourselves.

2. I feel strongly, however, that we should respond to Obey, who has been friendly toward us, and especially since these answers are in effect a reply to some strong attacks by the Israelis on our analysis. I also understand that General Scowcroft will be answering these same questions to Ambassador Dinitz.

STATINTL

NIO/ME

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1 consider this approach.

2 Secretary Kissinger. Obviously I have not thought it
3 through completely.

4 Senator Roth. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

5 Chairman Ribicoff. Senator Nunn?

6 Senator Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 Mr. Secretary, I share your frustration about knowing
8 who to brief. I think that is one of the purposes of the
9 Committee to hear, and one of the most serious things we
10 have.

11 Even if we decide on a joint oversight committee, there
12 will continue to be a need for committees like Armed Services
13 and Foreign Relations to get the substance of intelligence
14 information.

15 Even a joint committee, in my opinion, is not going to
16 limit to just a few people the flow of this information.

17 Do you want to comment on this?

18 Secretary Kissinger. Well, it depends on what you mean
19 by "the substance." The product of intelligence will obviously
20 have to be put before the Foreign Relations and Armed
21 Services Committees to enable them to do their job, but it is
22 not possible for the Armed Services Committee, for example,
23 to make a reasonable assessment about the adequacy of our
24 defense requests if it does not know the estimates of Soviet
25 or other strengths on which they are based.

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1 As I understand it, the oversight committee that is being
2 proposed here is designed to oversee the operations of the
3 Agency, and not only the final product. In that respect,
4 perhaps concentrating it would ease the problem somewhat.

5 Senator Nunn. One thing that comes to mind, we formerly
6 got a newsletter from CIA. Of course nobody used it as much as
7 probably would be advisable, but I found it very helpful.
8 Now that has been terminated.

9 Do you plan to interrupt the flow of intelligence to the
10 Armed Services Committee while we are struggling with this
11 legislative responsibility until we get a solution?

12 Secretary Kissinger. As I understand it, the daily
13 newsletter, that was a relatively recent innovation. That was
14 not something that had existence since the origin of time.

15 Senator Nunn. Within the last couple of years.

16 Secretary Kissinger. Certainly the flow of information
17 that the committees must have to do their job cannot be inter-
18 rupted while the Congress debates the appropriate oversight
19 procedures, and certainly the existing oversight procedures,
20 I would believe, should stay in place until alternative ones
21 have been approved by the Congress.

22 Senator Nunn. Whose decision was that to interrupt that
23 flow of information? Was that a CIA decision, or did it go
24 higher?

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Secretary Kissinger. I do not know precisely who made

1 the final decision. I would suspect that the White House
2 certainly was involved. *It was, indeed - ghs*

3 Senator Nunn. Mr. Secretary, I am not defensive about
4 the situation in Angola at all. I do think, though, that
5 many of your statements indicate that the Congress is solely
6 responsible for what was going on there. I did not vote
7 to terminate aid. It was a very close question, as far as I
8 was concerned.

9 Nevertheless, the Administration is not without other
10 remedies, for instance, economic sanctions; for instance,
11 technology; for instance, food; for instance, terminating
12 negotiations for a brief time. Yet what we see was a
13 Congressional cut-off of aid followed by Presidential announce-
14 ment that the food would continue to flow regardless of
15 Angola, followed by the Secretary of State going to Moscow
16 with negotiations as usual.

17 So the combination was Congressional cut-off and announce-
18 ment that business as usual would continue, notwithstanding
19 Angola, followed by action that indicated very strongly that
20 negotiations would continue notwithstanding Angola.

21 So it seems to me that Angola is a joint responsibility
22 and the Administration has not utilized fully the tools
23 available to it short of military aid.

24 Secretary Kissinger. Well, Senator, our concern with
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respect to Angola now is not to win retroactively an argument

1 ought to organize ourselves better than that, and I would
2 almost hate to put the question to you, Mr. Secretary, how
3 much of your time is involved.

4 Secretary Kissinger. While you are at it, would you do
5 the same for the Secretary of State?

6 Senator Percy. We will try to do that, with one excep-
7 tion coming up.

8 But I would like to say, and certainly my objective on
9 the Foreign Relations Committee is to try to reach out and
10 help in a small way to develop what the Senator from Michigan
11 did, and Vandenberg, in trying to develop a policy that
12 really allows us to speak with one voice.

13 We are a divided country on many things. Taking into
14 account the separation of powers, we ought to be able to come
15 together.

16 I think that this series of hearings have helped
17 immeasurably and working us towards the reorganization of
18 our effort, they will help in that regard.

19 One thing that I would urge, that the daily briefing
20 material that has been taken away from the Foreign Relations
21 Committee, I think is a disservice to the CIA. We are going
22 to have to ask --

23 Secretary Kissinger. When did that happen? Did it
24 happen recently?

1 We have had it for a long time. There has not been one
2 single breach of confidence that I know of. As a result of it
3 it saves a great deal of time. It saves us from calling the
4 agency constantly and asking for information. It is a concise
5 way of putting it.

6 I hope you can use your influence at the White House to
7 restore it.

8 Secretary Kissinger. Frankly, I did not know that that
9 had been stopped.

10 Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
11 your consideration.

12 Chairman Ribicoff. One final comment.

13 Towards the end, you talked about the problems when a
14 bureaucracy gets large, you can have the best policy in the
15 world and if you cannot deliver it, it is meaningless.

16 As these hearings develop -- tomorrow we have the
17 Attorney General -- what has become very apparent to me is
18 that Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Colby, Mr. Helms, Mr. Kelley, Mr.
19 Phillips, who represents former intelligence agents, they
20 are not very far apart in their thinking from the Committee's
21 thinking, and yet when you read in the Press of how the
22 Executive Branch is thinking, it in no way tracks with the
23 way the witnesses from the Administration are talking.

24 I know, having been in the Executive Branch, that what

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frequently happens with the Secretary or with the President,

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executive Registry

76-909

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12 February 1976

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1
Director

In his recent testimony before the Senate Government Operations Committee on congressional oversight, Secretary Kissinger discussed cut-off of the NID. Attached are his remarks which came in response to questions from Senators Nunn and Percy.

STATINTL

George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel

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